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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Joshua Thomas Bennett asserts the district court erred when it dismissed his petition for
post-conviction relief, because the court improperly dismissed his Confrontation Clause claim
without providing any notice of the grounds for dismissal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
In Bonneville County No. CR 2012-16081, Mr. Bennett was convicted of delivery of a
controlled substance. (See R., pp.6, 37.) The district court imposed a unified sentence of five
years, with two-and-one-half years fixed. (R., p.6.) Mr. Bennett appealed, and the Idaho Court
of Appeals affirmed his judgment of conviction. State v. Bennett, No. 41355, 2015 Unpublished
Opinion No. 388 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2015).
Mr. Bennett filed a Petition and Affidavit for Post Conviction Relief. (R., pp.6-9.) As
one ground for relief, the petition asserted, “[t]he district court erred & violated Mr. Bennett’s
Sixth Amendment rights when it refused to allow him to confront accuser & sustained the State’s
objection during cross examination” (hereinafter, the Confrontation Clause claim). (R., p.7.) In
the Affidavit of Facts in Support of Post-Conviction Petition (R., pp.22-28), Mr. Bennett asserted
the district court had precluded him from cross-examining the State’s confidential informant
witness about their drug history (R., p.26).
The petition also asserted “[i]neffective assistance of counsel” as a ground for relief.
(R., p.7.) Mr. Bennett asserted his first trial counsel was ineffective because he had a conflict of
interest in representing another defendant, which caused counsel to fail to convey a plea offer
from the State. (See R., p.20.) Mr. Bennett also asserted his second trial counsel was ineffective
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for failing to object to particular testimony, failing to object when a witness lied, and failing to
call a witness who would have proven Mr. Bennett’s innocence. (See R., pp.30-31.)
The State filed an Answer.

(R., pp.37-39.)

The State denied Mr. Bennett’s post-

conviction claims. (See R., pp.37-38.) As an affirmative defense, the State argued, “any issues
which could have been raised on appeal, but were not, are forfeited and may not be considered in
Post-Conviction proceedings.” (R., p.38.) The State asked the district court to enter a judgment
against Mr. Bennett and for the State, denying Mr. Bennett the relief sought in the petition.
(R., p.38.)
The State also filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal. (R., pp.40-44.) The State wrote
that Mr. Bennett “alleges that his 6th Amendment rights were violated and that his counsel was
ineffective.” (R., p.40.) The State “synthesized” Mr. Bennett’s assertions into two claims:
(1) that his first trial counsel “did not forward an offer he would have taken”; and (2) that his
second trial counsel “was ineffective at trial because he did not object at times that Petitioner felt
like he should have objected, did not call a witness, and advised Petitioner not to testify.”
(R., p.40.)
The State contended Mr. Bennett had provided no admissible evidence his first trial
counsel failed to convey a plea offer, because Mr. Bennett’s statement that the plea offer was
given to counsel but never delivered to him, was inadmissible hearsay. (See R., pp.41-42.) The
State then argued Mr. Bennett had not established his second trial counsel was ineffective under
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), because counsel’s actions or inactions were
strategic or tactical decisions, as Mr. Bennett had acknowledged. (See R., pp.42-43.) The State
asked the district court to dismiss the petition. (R., p.43.) However, the State’s motion for
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summary dismissal did not further address Mr. Bennett’s Confrontation Clause claim as a
separate claim, nor did it articulate any grounds for dismissing that claim. (See R., pp.40-44.)
The district court scheduled a hearing on the motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp.4546.) Over a year later, after multiple continuances, the district court conducted the hearing. (See
R., pp.47-66, 68-76, 79-94.) The State argued, “there just simply is not the evidence to proceed
with this claim. . . . [T]here simply hasn’t been any sort of admissible evidence that’s been
brought forward to support either the claim that there was an offer that was—failed to be
communicated by counsel or sufficient evidence to meet the Strickland test for ineffective
assistance of counsel.” (Tr., p.4, L.21 – p.5, L.11.)1
Mr. Bennett’s post-conviction counsel asserted, “there are some things that I think if
properly pled could give rise to a review for post-conviction that I think would overcome
summary dismissal. I’m not conceding that his petition, his affidavit are not appropriate. I
would just ask the court to take it under advisement.” (Tr., p.7, L.21 – p.8, L.2.) Post-conviction
counsel also asserted, “I think there’s a colorable claim that [second trial counsel] should have
done more to object to certain testimony that was relied upon by the State for identification
purposes.” (Tr., p.10, Ls.7-14.)
The district court determined, “nothing in the petition really presents any concrete
evidence. There’s a lot of allegations and suppositions and assumptions and innuendo but no
real evidence that there was a violation of the standard applicable to an attorney representing
Mr. Bennett and whether any such violation had an effect on the ultimate outcome of the case,
which are the Strickland standards.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.10-17.) The district court continued: “So I’m
just not seeing the evidence . . . that would actually support this case going forward and to
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withstand a motion for summary dismissal. So I am going to grant the motion, and this case will
be dismissed.”

(Tr., p.16, Ls.18-22.)

The district court did not provide any grounds for

dismissing the Confrontation Clause claim. (See Tr., p.15, L.12 – p.16, L.23.)
The district court entered an Order of Dismissal, which determined “that Petitioner has
failed to provide sufficient evidence to support his claim. Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for
summary dismissal is granted.” (R., pp.95-96.) The district court also entered a Judgment
dismissing Mr. Bennett’s petition with prejudice. (R., pp.97-98.)
Mr. Bennett filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Order of Dismissal
and Judgment. (R., pp.105-08.)2

1

All citations to “Tr.” refer to the February 2, 2017 hearing on the motion for
summary dismissal.
2
Mr. Bennett also filed a timely Motion to Reconsider under I.R.C.P. 11.2. (R., pp.99-101.)
The motion to reconsider asserted that the State had not met its statutory obligation under
I.C. § 19-4906(a) to file the relevant portions of the record, precluding the State from seeking
summary dismissal, and that Mr. Bennett had raised a genuine issue of material fact on trial
counsel’s failure to more aggressively cross-examine the confidential informant. (See R., pp.99100.)
The State filed a motion to take judicial notice of the file in the underlying criminal case.
(R., pp.646-47.) Additionally, the State filed an Opposition to Motion to Reconsider, arguing
Mr. Bennett had not addressed the evidence in possession of trial counsel when he decided not to
cross-examine the confidential informant, or explained how cross-examining the confidential
informant would have changed the outcome of the case. (See R., pp.650-52.)
After conducting the hearing on the motion to reconsider (R., p.654), the district court
entered an Order denying the motion to reconsider (R., p.655-59). The district court determined
I.C. § 19-4906(a) did not oblige the State to file the record based on the mere possibility some
part of the record would be relevant to a claim. (R., p.656.) The district court then determined
Mr. Bennett had not established his attorneys’ alleged conduct was deficient or prejudicial. (See
R., p.658.)
On appeal, Mr. Bennett does not challenge the district court’s denial of the motion for
reconsideration.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it dismissed Mr. Bennett’s petition for post-conviction relief,
because the court improperly dismissed his Confrontation Clause claim without providing any
notice of the grounds for dismissal?
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ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed Mr. Bennett’s Petition For Post-Conviction Relief,
Because The Court Improperly Dismissed His Confrontation Clause Claim Without Providing
Any Notice Of The Grounds For Dismissal

A.

Introduction
Mr. Bennett asserts the district court erred when it dismissed his petition for post-

conviction relief, because the court improperly dismissed his Confrontation Clause claim without
providing any notice of the grounds for dismissal.

B.

Standard Of Review
As the Idaho Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n application for post-conviction relief

under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act (UPCPA) is civil in nature.” Charboneau v.
State, 144 Idaho 900, 903 (2007). “[T]he applicant for post-conviction relief must prove by a
preponderance of evidence the allegations upon which the application for post-conviction relief
is based.” Id. “[A]n application for post-conviction relief must contain more than ‘a short and
plain statement of the claim’ that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1)”; it “must
be verified with respect to facts with the personal knowledge of the applicant.” Id. (citing
I.C. § 19-4903). “The application must include affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting
its allegation, or must state why such supporting evidence is not included.” Id.
“Summary disposition of a petition for post-conviction relief is appropriate if the
applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact.” Id. (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b) &
(c)). The Charboneau Court held that, “[o]n review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief
application without an evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file
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and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.”
Id. “A court is required to accept the petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, but need not
accept the petitioner’s conclusions.” Id. “When the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle
the applicant to relief, the trial court may dismiss the application without holding an evidentiary
hearing.” Id. “Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief
when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not
justify relief as a matter of law.” Id.

C.

The District Court Improperly Dismissed Mr. Bennett’s Confrontation Clause Claim
Without Providing Any Notice Of The Grounds For Dismissal
Mr. Bennett asserts the district court improperly dismissed his Confrontation Clause

claim without providing any notice of the grounds for dismissal. Because the State did not
articulate any grounds for dismissing the Confrontation Clause claim in its motion for summary
dismissal, the district court had to provide notice of its grounds for dismissing that claim.
However, the district court did not provide Mr. Bennett with any notice of the grounds for
dismissal of the Confrontation Clause claim.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[a] court may grant the motion [for summary
dismissal] of either party under I.C. § 19-4906(c), or may dismiss the application sua sponte
under I.C. § 19-4906(b).” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523 (2007). For sua sponte
dismissals, when a district court is satisfied “on the basis of the application, the answer or
motion, and the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose
would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss
the application and its reasons for so doing.” I.C. § 19-4906(b). “The applicant shall be given an
opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal.” Id. In other words, “[a]
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petitioner is entitled to notice of the trial court’s contemplated grounds for dismissal and an
opportunity to respond before a petition for post-conviction relief is dismissed.” Ridgley v. State,
148 Idaho 671, 676 (2010).
A district court may grant a party’s motion for summary disposition of a post-conviction
application “when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
I.C. § 19-4906(c). The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “[b]ecause a post-conviction relief
proceeding is governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion for summary disposition
must state with particularity the grounds therefor.” DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601 (2009)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the State never stated with particularity any grounds for dismissal of the
Confrontation Clause claim in its motion for summary dismissal.

The State’s motion for

summary dismissal initially recognized Mr. Bennett had alleged “that his 6 th Amendment rights
were violated and that his counsel was ineffective.” (R., p.40.) However, the State synthesized
Mr. Bennett’s claims into two ineffective assistance of counsel claims; namely, that (1) his first
trial counsel “did not forward an offer he would have taken,” and (2) his second trial counsel
“was ineffective at trial because he did not object at times that Petitioner felt like he should have
objected, did not call a witness, and advised Petitioner not to testify.” (See R., p.40.) The State
argued Mr. Bennett had not presented sufficient evidence to support those ineffective assistance
of counsel claims. (See R., pp.41-42.) The State’s motion did not articulate any grounds for
dismissal of the Confrontation Clause claim as a separate claim. (See R., pp.40-42.)
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The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “[w]here the state has filed a motion for summary
disposition, but the court dismisses the application on grounds different from those asserted in
the state’s motion, it does so on its own initiative and the court must provide twenty days
notice.” Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995). In the instant case, because the
State did not articulate any grounds for dismissing the Confrontation Clause claim in its motion
for summary dismissal, the district court had to provide notice of its grounds for dismissing that
claim. See id.
But the district court did not provide Mr. Bennett with any notice of the contemplated
grounds for dismissing the Confrontation Clause claim. During the hearing on the motion for
summary dismissal, the district court focused on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims:
“[N]othing in the petition really presents any concrete evidence. There’s a lot of allegations and
suppositions and assumptions and innuendo but no real evidence that there was a violation of the
standard applicable to an attorney representing Mr. Bennett and whether any such violation had
an effect on the ultimate outcome of the case, which are the Strickland standards.” (Tr., p.16,
Ls.10-17.) The district court did not see evidence “that would actually support this case going
forward and to withstand a motion for summary dismissal.” (Tr., p.16, Ls.18-21.)
When the district court dismissed Mr. Bennett’s post-conviction petition, it did not
discuss the Confrontation Clause claim as a separate claim, much less give its contemplated
grounds for dismissal of that claim. (See R., pp.95-98; Tr., p.15, L.12 – p.16, L.23.) Thus, the
district court did not provide Mr. Bennett with any notice of the grounds for dismissal of the
Confrontation Clause claim.
Because the district court did not provide Mr. Bennett with any notice of the grounds for
dismissal of the Confrontation Clause claim, it improperly dismissed that claim. See, e.g.,
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Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676. The district court therefore erred when it dismissed Mr. Bennett’s
petition for post-conviction relief. See Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 322. The Confrontation
Clause claim should be remanded to the district court for further proceedings. See Murphy v.
State, 143 Idaho 139, 151 (Ct. App. 2006).

CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Bennett respectfully requests that the Court reverse the district
court’s Order of Dismissal and Judgment with respect to the Confrontation Clause claim, and
remand the claim for further proceedings.
DATED this 18th day of December, 2017.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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